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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
hibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In pro-
hibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an abso-
lute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a
social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject
to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process. This essential limitation of liberty in general
governs freedom of contract in particular." 16
TERRY LICHTASH.
VOLUNTARY ADOPTION BY THOSE IN MILITARY SERvIE.-The
legislature of the State of New York has demonstrated a definite
policy of aiding those away from home on active duty in the armed
forces, by enacting laws facilitating procedure relative to their legal
status.' In keeping with this general ,policy, the legislature has
recently amended the Domestic Relations Law dealing with voluntary
adoptions, facilitating thereby adoptions by those persons on active
duty in the armed forces of the United States.2
Although the concept of adoption is rooted essentially in the
concept of charity, it was known as a legal status only to some of the
continental systems of law, and primarily in the French and Spanish
law, but it was unknown to the English common law.3 As a result,
therefore, the whole modern concept in our law is purely one of
statutory regulation.4 Since it is a legislative creature, the legisla-
ture retains the power to create, destroy, and to limit the privilege of
adoption.5 Having the power to regulate the privilege, the legisla-
ture has been reluctant, in the past, to treat adopted children in the
same manner as natural children. In the first general enactment of
the subject of adoption into New York law,6 the adopted child was
permitted to assume all the relationships of a natural child, but the
law expressly excluded the right of inheritance. 7 In 1887, however,
16 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 391, 57 Sup. Ct. 578
(1937).
1 SOLDIERS AND SAILORS Civ. REL. AcT OF 1940, N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 686;
Survival of Power of Attorney After Death of Donor, N. Y. MuLir. LAW
§ 317a.
2 N. Y. DoM. REr. LAW § 112, pars. 1 and 5 as amended by L. 1945, c. 98.
3 United States Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 135 N. Y. Supp.
849 (1st Dep't 1912).
4 Carpenter v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 213 N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026(1914).
5In re Pierro, 173 Misc. 123, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 233 (1940).
6 L. 1873, c. 830, § 10.
7 Ibid.
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this disability was removed so as also to confer rights of inheritance.8
Despite the apparent lack of surface distinctions, there are still cer-
tain limitations in the law itself, impeding the complete right of
equal inheritance. Where, for example, real or personal property is
to pass to remaindermen upon a termination of a life interest in the
foster parent, upon the condition that he die without heirs, "the foster
child is not deemed the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the
rights of the remaindermen." 9 -And where the passing of property,
real or personal, is to go to remaindermen upon condition that the
foster child die without brothers or sisters him surviving, "no other
foster child or natural child of the foster parents is deemed a brother
or sister so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen." LO The courts,
too, still persist in finding basis for distinctions. It was held in
In re Leask 11 that a devise to A for life, and upon his death, the
payment of the principal which was to be made to "his child or
children" did not include adopted children. In so holding, the court
interpreted the facts of the case to fit adequately into the statutory
intent of preserving the rights of remaindermen, 12 as opposed to
complete equality of inheritability. Generally speaking, however, the
adopted child inherits from foster parents by virtue of the statute,13
but not through them as natural children.14
The current law defines "voluntary adoption" to mean any adop-
tion other than that of a minor who has been placed for adoption by
an authorized agency.15 "Voluntary adoption," therefore, is to be
distinguished as characterizing voluntary acts of private individuals
who have manifested a desire to adopt independently of the mechan-
ics of legally instituted agencies. Since such agreement is in its
essence the culmination of a voluntary act that naturally leads the
parties into the assumption of obligations of a completely new legal
relationship and status, the law seeks always to maintain strict control
over the circumstances at all stages of the adoption proceedings, in
order that it supervise closely the manner of giving consents 16 essen-
tial to initiate the status, and in this way to protect the adopted child
from becoming a mere chattel. To this end, the law requires that
the consent of "the foster parents or parent, the foster child, and all
persons whose consent is required by Section 111" of the Domestic
Relations Law 17 to appear for examination before a judge or surro-
8 L. 1887, c. 703.
9 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 115, par. 4.
20 Id. par. 8.
"In re Leask, 197 N. Y. 193, 90 N. E. 652 (1910); accord, Matter of
Horn, 256 N. Y. 294, 176 N. E. 399 (1931).
12 See notes 9 and 10 smpra.
23I n re Cuddeback's Will, 174 Misc. 322, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 862 (1940).
14 Matter of Brenner, 149 Misc. 412, 267 N. Y. Supp. 765 (1933).
25 N. Y. Dom. RE . LAW § 109, par. 5.
16 Id. §§ 111, 112.
'1 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111 lists the following persons whose consent
is required, ". . . 1. Of the foster child if over fourteen years of age; 2. Of
the parents or surviving parent of a child born in wedlock; 3. Of the mother
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gate. The procedure which necessitates the giving of consents is
strictly followed, and the natural rights of the natural parents are
always minutely watched, and afforded the fullest protection of the
law.' 8 Where, on the other hand, a parent is deemed to have aban-
doned " his or her child, consent is thereby rendered unnecessary,
2 0
or if the foster child is over eighteen years of age, the court in its
discretion may dispense with consents of persons listed as necessary
by statute.21  All persons required by statute to execute their con-
sents 22 must appear for examination before the judge or surrogate
of the county where the foster parents reside, or if the foster parents
are not residents of the state, then they must appear before the judge
or surrogate in the county where the foster child resides. 23  So
strictly is this requirement interpreted, that in ,Mfurphy v. Brooks 24
an order confirming an adoption was set aside for failure to recite the
appearance of the adoptive father before the county judge, where the
actual fact was that he did not appear, but that his acknowledgment
was taken by the captain of a ship on which he was employed. The
court held the acknowledgment to be void since it was not properly
authenticated in strict compliance with federal law for authentication
of documents. The statute further provides that the petition 25 must
be verified, the agreement and consents executed and acknowledged,
of a child born out of wedlock; 4. Of any person or authorized agency having
lawful possession of the foster child."
:8 Caruso v. Caruso, 175 Misc. 200, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 239 (1940).
19 "Abandonment" was construed in respect to adoption as the conduct on
the part of the parent that clearly evinces a definite purpose to cast off all
parental duties and obligations toward the child in In re Cohen's Adoption,
155 Misc. 202, 279 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1935).
20 In In re Cohen's Adoption, cited supra note 19, the court indicated
further, that if no abandonment could be found, the natural right of the parent
would prevail, and the state was powerless to interfere with the parent's natural
right over the child.
21 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111, par. 4.
22 Ibid.
23 Id. § 112, par. 1.
24 120 Misc. 704, 199 N. Y. Supp. 660 (1923).
25 N. Y. Domr. Rn.. LAW § 112, par. 2 provides that foster parents or
parent, and the foster child if over eighteen years of age must present to the
judge or surrogate, 1. a petition stating, (a) names and places of residences
of petitioners; (b) whether they are married or unmarried; (c) if married,
whether they are living together as man and wife; (d) the name, date, and
place of birth of the foster child; (e) the religious faith of the petitioners;
(f) the religious faith of the foster child and his parents; (g) the facts, if
necessary, that render the consents of either or both the parents of the foster
child unnecessary; (h) the manner in which the foster parents obtained the
foster child; (i) the period of time the foster child has resided with foster
parents; (j) approximate income of the petitioners; (k) the proposed name,
if any, of the foster child; (1) that no previous application has been made
before any judge or surrogate for the same relief, or if made, its disposition;
(m) whether the foster child has been previously adopted; all of which state-
ments shall be taken prina facie as true. 2. An agreement on the part of the
foster parents to adopt and treat the foster child as their own lawful child.
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the proof given and the affidavits sworn to by the respective persons
before such judge or surrogate.2 6
It is readily evident, therefore, that a foster parent on active
duty in the armed forces of the United States could not be present at
the time so required pursuant to statute.27 Hence, to facilitate adop-
tions among the members of the armed forces, the legislature has
amended the requirement for personal appearance in respect to such
members of the armed forces.28  As the amended statute now pro-
vides, it is possible where the foster parent, who is on active duty, is
married to the natural parent of the child, for the county judge or
surrogate to dispense with the appearance of the foster parent, when
the natural parent and spouse is actually present before such judge
or surrogate, in person, for the required examinations. 29 Where this
is the method followed, and the verification, agreement and consent
of the parent in the armed forces is necessary, it is deemed sufficient
if such verification, agreement and consent be duly acknowledged, or
proved and certified in form sufficient to entitle a conveyance to be
recorded in this state.30 Upon the receipt of such papers duly ac-
knowledged, the judge or surrogate may grant the order of adoption
without the personal appearance of such foster parent, parent, or
person.31 The amended act, as adopted, was made retroactive in
effect, applying to all proceedings for adoption instituted since De-
cember 1, 1941.32
It is submitted that the amendment will be beneficial in effect,
since by its scope, it seeks to strengthen the status of marriage by
removing a possible latent cause for disunity, and to aid further in
stabilizing the family unit, as well as eventually to insure the adequate
rearing of the children so adopted.
MICHAEL L. POLICHETTI.
NEW YORK COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL Acrs.-Not the least
of the social and economic problems created by the war have been
those which have confronted the tenants of real property who have
found it necessary to execute or renew a lease under the abnormal
conditions brought on by our involvement. It is but pointing out
the obvious to say that building construction very nearly ceased in
New York City even before we became engaged in the war, while
the demand for living quarters and commercial space increased sharply
as a result of the increased activity and the concentration of workers
26 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 112, par. 5.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. pars. 1 and 5 as amended by L. 1945, c. 98.
29 Id. par. 5.
30 Ibid.; see also N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 for method of recording
conveyances.
31 See note 30 supra.
32 L. 1945, c. 98, § 2.
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